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Abstract. With the current trend of moving intelligent services and administration towards the 
public private partnership, and the security controls that are currently in place, the shareable 
data modeling initiative has become a controversial issue. Existing applications often rely on 
isolation or trusted networks for their access control or security, whereas untrusted wide area 
networks pay little attention to the authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of the data they 
transport. In this paper, we examine the issues that must be considered when providing network 
access to an existing probation service environment. We describe how we intend to implement 
the proposed solution in one probation service application. We describe the architecture that 
allows remote access to the legacy application, providing it with encrypted communications and 
strongly authenticated access control but without requiring any modifications to the underlying 
application.  
Keywords: RAS, Secure Mobile Working, Security Standards. 
1   Introduction 
The public sector model has evolved over the years but it continues to be a reactive 
model to new legislations and policies. The arching factor of cost versus scalability 
and robustness has become very visible, and it has established itself as the most 
significant consideration in any technical design. The traditional Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) structure has not evolved as fast as technology and the offering of 
new tools on traditional infrastructures where the essence of these is to protect data 
and uphold confidentiality. However, the limitation and the disparity between what 
the private and public sector can offer has exaggerated the need for bridging 
connectivity over legacy boundaries that are no longer flexible enough to 
accommodate new advances and developments. This is very much a systematic 
problem for the public sector in particular where the requirements for personnel to 
have remote and mobile access to classified data (e.g. at Restricted or IL3 level or 
higher). The modeling of true, secure mobile working shouldn’t be a generic 
implementation of technology. It needs to ensure acceptance of various managements 
within a complex structure of partnership adhering to different affiliations’ of security 
standards. To mitigate the risks, the implementation needs to address both technical 
controls and potential human intervention or malicious intent. 
 The next section discusses the RAS modeling guidelines. Section 3 then provides an 
overview of the potential design of the solution. Finally, conclusion and future work is 
presented in section 4.   
2   RAS Modeling Guidelines 
In its logical interpretation, the conceptual design of the solution and how it manages 
security accreditation (certification) [1] is based on the below guidelines: 
1. Protection and Confidentiality: each traffic flow is protected in accordance 
with the established requirements. This includes flows between the remote 
client device and the remote access server, and between the remote access 
server and internal resources. Protection should be verified by means such as 
monitoring network traffic or checking traffic logs.  
2. Authentication: is required and cannot be readily compromised or 
circumvented. All authentication policies are enforced. Performing robust 
testing of authentication is important to reduce the risk of attackers accessing 
protected internal resources.  
3. Applications: the remote access solution does not interfere with the use of 
software applications that are permitted to be used through remote access, 
nor does it disrupt the operation of the remote client devices (for example, a 
VPN client conflicting with a host-based firewall).  
4. Management: Administrators can configure and manage the solution 
effectively and securely. This includes all components, including remote 
access servers, authentication services, and client software. The ease of 
deployment and configuration is particularly important, such as having fully 
automated client configuration versus administrators manually configuring 
each client. Another concern is the ability of users to alter remote access 
client settings, which could weaken remote access security. Automating 
configurations for devices can greatly reduce unintentional errors from users 
incorrectly configuring settings.  
5. Logging: the remote access solution logs security events in accordance with 
the organisation’s policies. Some remote access solutions provide more 
granular logging capabilities than others. An example is logging usage of 
individual applications versus only connections to particular hosts. So in 
some cases it may be necessary to rely on the resources used through remote 
access to perform portions of the logging that the remote access server cannot 
perform.  
6. Performance: the solution provides adequate performance during normal 
and peak usage. It is important to consider not only the performance of the 
primary remote access components, but also that of intermediate devices, 
such as routers and firewalls. Performance is particularly important when 
large software updates are being provided through the remote access solution 
to the remote client devices. Encrypted traffic often consumes more 
processing power than unencrypted traffic, so it may cause bottlenecks. In 
many cases, the best way to test the performance under load of a prototype is 
to use simulated traffic generators on a live test network to mimic the actual 
characteristics of expected traffic as closely as possible. Testing should 
incorporate a variety of applications that will be used with remote access.  
7. Security: the remote access implementation itself may contain vulnerabilities 
and weaknesses that attackers could exploit. High security needs may choose 
to perform extensive vulnerability assessments against the remote access 
components. At a minimum, all components should be updated with the 
latest patches and configured following sound security practices.  
8. Default Settings: The default values for each remote access setting and alter 
the settings are reviewed as necessary o support security requirements.  The 
remote access device should be assured to ensure that it does not 
unexpectedly “fall back” to default settings for interoperability or other 
reasons.  
9. Acceptance: the CA “certification authority” will depend on a holistic 
approach necessary to develop an effective security infrastructure. This is in 
addition to discussing the individual components and the role they play 
[2][3]. 
3   Technical Foundation  
The implementation enables the Public/Private partnership to build a RAS offering 
that meets the requirements for CESG “National Technical Authority for Information 
Assurance” [8]. The RAS solution will need to meet CESG guidelines for data 
handling and as such the data classification for the RAS compliance with IL3 level 
[4][5]. 
 
An application database that is hosted within the GSI cloud would be built around 
application guidelines and would adhere to CESG policy.  The database would be 
migrated into a previously accredited environment and therefore would not be 
required to follow an additional accreditation submission. The model proposes that 
the desired solution for Users within the field recording and updating national and 
protected records would be a 3G enabled device. 
 
This remote device solution will be designed within the following recommendations: 
 
• Hardware must support TPM “Trusted Platform Module” chip technology. 
• The Operating System will be Microsoft based. 
• The hardware will be encrypted using Windows Bitlocker. 
• The Bitlocker entropy will be supplied by Becrypt. 
• Backup Entropy will be stored on a secure server within the previously 
accredited environment. 
• USB bitlocker token authentication will be required to log on to the laptop. 
• The hardware build will include Cisco VPN client and require client 
certificates. 
• Internet browsing will be by proxy via the secure internet [6]. 
• 3G dongle for internet connectivity for hardware devices 
 
The figure below shows a user connecting to the complimentary environment via a 
client/server VPN connection and then being forwarded to the application VLAN 
within the same environment. 
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Fig. 1. Proposed solution architecture overview 
4   Conclusion 
Internet is changing the way public sector activities are conducted. Security 
compliance of mobile working solutions is the enabling technologies that simplify the 
management and security of such activities. With the right approach to an accredited 
implementation, public sector organizations with obligatory responsibility to protect 
confidentiality can spend less time worrying about security, while focusing on their 
main activities. For example, confidential documents no longer need to wait for days 
to be physically shipped. Instead, they can be securely sent through e-mail. Web 
servers can allow secure access for only designated users, eliminating the need for 
human intervention. Public sector organization networks including military can 
securely extend over the Internet, eliminating expensive leased data lines. Future 
work is geared towards further integration and consolidation of platforms to deliver 
further efficiencies. In practical terms certifying authorities will be encouraged to 
come together in a cooperative intervention to deliver an agreed upon security 
baseline. 
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